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EXAMINING THE EUROPEAN GEOGRAPHY OF REFUGEE 
PROTECTION 
EXCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND EXCEPTIONS FROM THE 1967 
PROTOCOL TO THE PRESENT 
 
 
Elspeth Guild* 
 
Introduction: the Geography of the Refugee Convention 
Refugee protection is premised on the principle that national territory and state 
sovereignty matter. A refugee exists in relation to at least two states (unless 
stateless), that of origin which either actively seeks to persecute him or her or 
passively allows or is unable to prevent others from persecuting the individual; 
and that of protection where the sovereign claim to territory permits the pro-
tecting state to provide shelter. Borders matter a lot for refugees as it is only 
by crossing borders of sovereignty out of and into territories that they come 
into existence. 
As Goodwin-Gill puts it in the opening words of his book on the refugee in 
international law – ‘the refugee in international law occupies a legal space 
characterized, on the one hand, by the principle of State sovereignty and the 
related principles of territorial supremacy and self-preservation’.1 In this article 
I am going to examine some of the issues around the geography of refugee 
protection in Europe since the end of WWII.  
Universality and the Refugee Convention 
Universality in relation to refugee protection is a much contested issue among 
international jurists. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 (UDHR) – 
the cornerstone declaration of all the states of the United Nations regarding 
universal norms following the catastrophe of WWII – provides strong support 
for a universal approach to protection. Article 14 states that everyone has the 
right to seek and enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution. Its second 
paragraph establishes the national security exception – this right may not be 
invoked in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising from non-political crimes 
                                         
*  Jean Monnet Professor ad personam Radboud University Nijmegen, Queen Mary, Univer-
sity of London and Partner, Kingsley Napley, London, e.guild@jur.ru.nl.  
1  G.S. Goodwin-Gill & J. McAdam, The Refugee in International Law, 3rd ed., Oxford: OUP 
2009 at 6. 
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or from acts contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations. 
However, the interpretation and legal status of the UDHR in contemporary in-
ternational law has been much disputed.2 Nonetheless, its relationship with the 
UN Convention relating to the status of refugees 1951 and its 1967 Protocol 
(Refugee Convention) has been firmly fixed not so much by the drafting history 
of the Refugee Convention as by courts around the world charged with its in-
terpretation.3 The central principle of the right to seek asylum in the UDHR is 
that of protection – in Refugee Convention terms, non-refoulement – an entitle-
ment to remain on the sovereign territory of a state where the alternative is 
return to a state which is likely to persecute the individual. 
It might be thought by those not familiar with the legal literature in the ar-
ea that this is a rather straightforward matter and that the conclusion could be 
the acceptance of the principle of non-refoulement as a norm of customary in-
ternational law. This is certainly not the case. A vivid discussion of the issue can 
be found in Chimni’s International Refugee Law Reader4 which poses the debate 
between Goodwin-Gill, Hailbronner and Hathaway on the issue. Universality of 
the principle of non-refoulement cannot, as yet at least, be taken as accepted 
in the international community. The reason is founded in the investment of na-
tional sovereignty in controls on the movement of persons at borders of states. 
A universal obligation to resist refusing admission and refrain from sending 
back a person claiming a need for international protection to the country from 
which he or she claims protection sits uneasily with statist claims to control and 
choose who enters the territory of a state and who does not. It is this geogra-
phy of refugee protection which I will examine further here. 
The Refugee Convention and its Geography 
The Refugee Convention in its definition of a refugee in Article 1(A)(2) sets out 
the starting parameters of geography: 
 
‘As a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and owing to well 
founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the 
country of his nationality and is unable or owing to such fear unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationali-
                                         
2  Einarsen, ‘Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol’, in A. 
Zimmermann et al., The 1951 Convention, a Commentary, Oxford: OUP 2011, p. 37-75 
at 47. 
3  J. McAdam, ‘Interpretation of the 1951 Convention’, in Zimmermann et al. 2011, p. 91 
and 106. 
4  New Delhi: Sage 2000, p. 109-117. 
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ty and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result 
of such events, is unable, or owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’  
 
Until the individual is outside his or her country of nationality or habitual resi-
dence, he or she is not a refugee. At best the person is an internally displaced 
person for whom there is no specific international convention providing a source 
of rights.5 The border of state sovereignty creates the refugee, conjuring into 
existence a status of entitlements embedded in international law. However, at 
the same time, borders can be deceptive for the refugee. State borders are 
not always contiguous with state sovereignty when it comes to international pro-
tection obligations. The appearance of a state on a map does not necessarily 
provide the contours of the state’s border which is central to the ability of a 
person to transform him- or herself into a refugee.  
Moreno Lax has examined this issue in depth and with elegance in her re-
cent research ‘The Legality of the “safe third country” Notion Revisited:  an ap-
praisal in light of general international rules on the law of treaties’.6 Among the 
most notorious examples of this kind of shifting sovereignty which she docu-
ments in detail has taken place in Australia. That country has excised some of 
its territory exclusively so that the Refugee Convention (and other protection 
obligations) does not apply in that excised bit of land. The individual arriving 
apparently within Australian sovereignty is by that same sovereignty excluded 
from protection by a sovereign decision to redefine the borders of its sover-
eignty for the Refugee Convention. Moreno Lax documents and challenges the-
se invisibilisation measures, if one can call them that, calling into question their 
very legality in international law. 
Nonetheless as the Refugee Convention began as an exercise in geogra-
phy, it is perhaps not surprising that its geography continues to haunt it. It com-
mences with a temporal limitation – the events occurring before 1 January 
1951. Article 1(B)(1) and (2) extend this limitation to a spatial one as well: 
 
‘For the purposes of this Convention, the words “events before 1 January 
1951” in article 1 section A, shall be understood to mean either (a) “events 
occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” or (b) “events occurring in Eu-
rope or elsewhere before 1 January 1951”; and each Contracting State shall 
make a declaration at the time of signature, ratification or accession, specify-
                                         
5  E. Guild, Security and Migration in the 21st Century, Cambridge: Polity 2009, p. 68-86. 
6  V. Moreno Lax, ‘The “Safe Third Country” Notion Revisited: An Appraisal in light of Gen-
eral International Rules on the Law of Treaties’, in G.S. Goodwin-Gill (ed.), 2010 Study 
Session, The Hague Academy of International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 2012. 
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ing which of these meanings it applies for the purpose of its obligations under 
this Convention.’  
 
As Goodwin-Gill and McAdam point out, the Refugee Convention was not con-
ceived to provide protection for all refugees, only those defined in time and 
space by WWII.7 Schmahl notes that the Convention was primarily designed to 
create secure conditions such as would facilitate the sharing of the European 
refugee burden after WWII.8 Thus, Europe is the geographical centre of the 
Refugee Convention. Of the two options for the temporal meaning of the Con-
vention (1 January 1951), both commence with the notion of Europe either as 
an exclusive source of the transformative capacity to create refugees or as the 
principal source, which can be augmented by ‘elsewhere’. The geographical 
limitation on refugee protection was surprisingly popular not least in Europe 
itself. Indeed by 2011 only four contracting parties to the Convention have 
retained the Europe limitation – two of them in Europe itself – Monaco and Tur-
key and two in Africa – Congo and Madegascar.9 Oddly, the USA has only 
ratified the Protocol not the Convention itself (it is the only state to have done 
so).  
The Universalist Push – the 1967 Protocol 
The drafting history of the Protocol indicates that the push to lift the temporal 
and geographical limitations of the Refugee Convention arose in the 1960s as 
a result of refugee movements and needs in Africa.10 UNHCR was a key actor 
kicking off the discussion in 1964 as a result of the organization’s problems in 
refugee protection in that region. The objective of the Protocol was to endow 
the Refugee Convention with the universalism which it was, until then, lacking.11 
The problem, as it appeared at that time, was not with the substance of the 
definition of a refugee or protection but with the temporal and geographical 
limitations. Refugees were perceived as an intra-African issue which could be 
resolved by a Protocol to the Refugee Convention. This was also a way to en-
sure the life span of the Convention, particularly in face of competition from the 
Organization of African Unity which had already begun its own refugee con-
vention.  
The Protocol states:  
                                         
7  Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2009 at 36. 
8  Schmahl, Zimmermann Commentary on the 1951 Convention, Oxford: OUP 2011 at 469. 
9  UN Documents: Accessions to the Protocol 1967. 
10  Louise W. Holborn, Refugees: A Problem of Our Time. The Work of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, 1951-1972, Metuchen, JN: Scarecrow Press 1985, 
p. 823-956. 
11  Einarsen 2011. 
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‘2. For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term “refugee” shall, except 
as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person 
within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words “As a result 
of events occurring before 1 January 1951 and...” and the words “...as a re-
sult of such events”, in article 1 A (2) were omitted.  
3. The present Protocol shall be applied by the States Parties hereto without 
any geographic limitation, save that existing declarations made by States al-
ready Parties to the Convention in accordance with article I B (I) (a) of the 
Convention, shall, unless extended under article I B (2) thereof, apply also 
under the present Protocol.’ 
 
European response to the Protocol was fairly enthusiastic at least from the 
Western side of the Berlin Wall. Of the 2012 EU Member States which were 
not under Communist rule in the 1960s and 1970s, 14 signed up between 
1967 (Sweden signed in 1967 and Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and the UK in 1968) and 1978 (Spain was the late comer). A 
very cursory look at the UK’s refugee arrival situation in 1979 indicates that 
there were under 2,000 applications for refugee status or asylum in that year. 
The majority of applications were from Iranians (25%) followed by Sri Lankans 
(14%). The African contribution to UK asylum applications in that year was lim-
ited to Somalia (7%), Uganda (6%) and Ghana (5%). The undifferentiated 
category ‘rest of the world’ which accounted for 27% of applications no doubt 
also included other nationals of African countries.12 According to Eurostat,13 in 
2011 the UK had received 26,430 asylum applications. The top four countries 
of origin of asylum seekers to the UK in the second quarter of 2011 (the most 
recent available from Eurostat) were: Pakistan (890), Iran (635), Libya (585), 
Sri Lanka (505) and Afghanistan (440).14 For the EU the top countries of origin 
of asylum seekers were, in order of importance, Afghanistan, Russia, Pakistan, 
Iraq and Serbia.15  I include these figures only to indicate that the change in 
numbers and to a lesser extent source countries of refugees to the UK was not 
immediately or obviously changed by the ratification of the Protocol. We must 
look elsewhere to find reasons for the changing face of refugee claims in the 
UK and the EU over the past 30 years. 
What is interesting is the enthusiasm for changing the Refugee Convention 
from one subject to a temporal and geographical limitation to a universal in-
                                         
12  Home Office statistical bulletin, Issue 22/90; 24 July 1990. 
13  Eurostat Newsrelease 46/2012, 23 March 2012. 
14  Eurostat Statistics in Focus 11/2012. 
15  Eurostat Newsrelease 46/2012, 23 March 2012. 
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strument. Many European states embraced the idea and acceded among the 
first to the new universalism.   
Changing Protection Challenges: Another Step towards Universalism 
The question of the geographical scope of refugee protection receded into the 
background in Europe from the end of the 1960s until the end of the 1980s as 
regards activities at the international level. Instead, the adequacy of the scope 
of protection became a matter of concern and international action. The UDHR 
prohibits torture under Article 5. While this prohibition had been included in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 12) 1966, no sepa-
rate convention against torture had been developed under the Article 5 UDHR 
framework. The use of torture by a number of regimes in Latin America (Chile, 
Argentina, etc.) and in Europe in Greece, Portugal and Spain under the dicta-
torships in the 1960s and 1970s outraged international public opinion. In De-
cember 1975 the UN General Assembly adopted a Declaration against torture 
and in 1977 formally requested the drafting of a text for a binding Conven-
tion against Torture based on the 1975 Declaration.16 In the first draft pro-
duced in 1978 what is now Article 3 prohibiting return to torture was already 
present. The provision went through a variety of changes and amendments in 
the finalization of the Convention but it was never excluded. UNHCR was active 
in the negotiations on the Convention and intervened a number of times on the 
exact wording of the provision. However, from Nowak’s detailed analysis of 
the negotiation process, nowhere was the exact relationship of the Convention 
to the Refugee Convention overtly discussed. Instead it was the use of the word 
‘extradite’ which led to much soul searching in the various meetings as states 
fretted about the consequences which this might have on their extradition 
agreements. 
In 1984 the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT) was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly and opened for ratification. From the first draft of the 
Convention the prohibition on return to torture was present.17 Now incorporated 
into Article 3 UNCAT, it states: 
 
‘No State Party shall expel, return (“refouler”) or extradite a person to an-
other State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would 
be in danger of being subjected to torture.’  
 
                                         
16  M. Nowak & E. McArthur, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Commentary, 
Oxford: OUP 2008, p. 3-4. 
17  Ibid., p. 130-131. 
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The geography of international protection which had been widened to the 
whole world through the Refugee Convention’s 1967 Protocol was now 
changed again. The personal scope of protection was no longer limited to per-
sons fearing persecution on one of the five grounds but would now apply also 
to anyone at risk of torture (as defined in the Convention.) Among European 
states, France, Lithuania, Sweden and Bulgaria were among the first to ratify 
the new Convention in 1986. Most of the EU states ratified the Convention be-
tween 1987 and 1989. The last one to ratify it was Ireland in 2002. Generally 
one can see a certain enthusiasm in Europe for the Convention, including Article 
3.  
It is somewhat ironical that the treaty body, the UN Committee against Tor-
ture, which under Article 22 of the convention may receive individual complaints 
in respect of any state which has acceded to the complaints mechanism, has 
received the largest number of complaints in respect of Article 3 against Swe-
den. The UNCAT has also found the largest number of violations of Article 3 by 
Sweden. These decisions are not about torture taking place in Sweden but 
about the refusal of Sweden to allow persons seeking refuge from torture to 
remain in the country.18 
The European Court of Human Rights Catches Up 
The most famous European regional human rights instrument is the European 
Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR). It constitutes a foundational docu-
ment of the Council of Europe which encompasses 47 countries in the region. 
The ECHR does not contain an express prohibition on refoulement either for 
refugees or torture victims. It does, however, contain a prohibition on torture. 
The ECHR created a court, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) which is 
charged with examining interstate and individual complaints that Council of 
Europe states have violated their ECHR obligations. The reach of the ECHR is 
very specific: according to Article 1 it applies to anyone within the jurisdiction 
of a Member State. While this is primarily a state territorial concept, the ac-
tions of states beyond their geographical territory but within their jurisdiction 
(for instance the actions of state agents abroad) come within the scope of the 
ECHR.19 
The territorially bound approach to international protection was taken up 
by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) swiftly after UNCAT was rati-
fied by a number of European states. It interpreted Article 3 ECHR – its prohi-
bition on torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment – as includ-
                                         
18  Ibid., p. 127-128. 
19  Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom - 55721/07 [2011] ECHR 1093 (7 July 
2011). 
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ing return to a country where there is a substantial risk of such treatment in 
1989 and 1991.20 First in a challenge to the extradition of a German national 
from the UK to the USA, the ECtHR considered the UN Convention against Tor-
ture and how it related to the ECHR obligation in Article 3 to prohibit torture, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The Court moved to align its 
jurisprudence with the developments taking place at the international level and 
for the first time found that expulsion (or in this case extradition) of an individ-
ual to a country where there was a serious risk that the individual would suffer 
torture, inhuman or degrading treatment was contrary to Article 3 ECHR: ‘That 
the abhorrence of torture has such implications is recognised in Article 3 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, which provides that “no State Party shall ... 
extradite a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture”.’ The fact that a specialised 
treaty should spell out in detail a specific obligation attaching to the prohibition 
of torture does not mean that an essentially similar obligation is not already 
inherent in the general terms of Article 3 (art. 3) of the European Convention. It 
would hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention, that 
‘common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to 
which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting State knowingly to surrender a 
fugitive to another State where there were substantial grounds for believing 
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture, however heinous the 
crime allegedly committed.’21 The development of the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on 
the prohibition of return of an individual to a country where there is a serious 
risk that he or she would be subjected to torture has been most eloquently de-
scribed by Mole.22 
While the ECtHR has come under intense pressure on occasion to reduce the 
space for international protection, through for instance the acceptance of dip-
lomatic assurances from states of origin, it has been robust in the defense of the 
principle of protection against return to torture, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment of punishment as an inherent component of Article 3 ECHR.23 
                                         
20  Soering v. United Kingdom - 14038/88 [1989] ECHR 14 (7 July 1989); Cruz Varas & 
Ors v. Sweden - 15576/89 [1991] ECHR 26 (20 March 1991); Vilvarajah & Ors v. 
United Kingdom - 13163/87; 13164/87; 13165/87 [1991] ECHR 47 (30 October 
1991). 
21  Soering v. United Kingdom - 14038/88 [1989] ECHR 14 (7 July 1989). 
22  N. Mole & C. Meredith, Asylum and the European Convention on Human Rights, Human 
Rights Files No. 9, Strasbourg: Council of Europe 2010. 
23  Saadi v. Italy - 37201/06 [2008] ECHR 179 (28 February 2008). 
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Diminishing the Geography of Refugee Protection in Europe:  
the Aznar Protocol 
The European Union’s relationship with refugee protection has been somewhat 
complicated. The European Economic Community Treaty does from 1957, one 
of the founding treaties of the EU. While it includes a right to free movement of 
workers within the territory of the Member States, no mention is made of refu-
gees. Indeed, the first appearance of refugees in an EU legislative measure 
was in Regulation 15/61, on the coordination of social security rights. This re-
mains the only reference until the EU treaty was created and the other treaties 
revised in 1993. More important was the treaty changes which took place in 
1999 when the EU institutions were charged with adopting legislative measures 
to create a Common European Asylum System. It is worth remembering, howev-
er, that the EU’s move to competence in the field of asylum only came into be-
ing with the EU objective of removing border controls, including on persons 
moving among the Member States.  
Resulting from this ambition to abolish border controls on the movement of 
persons within the EU, the first concern of the EU in this area was how to keep 
asylum seekers (and indeed recognized refugees) in the territory of the state 
responsible for them and to prevent them roaming around the border control 
free EU. This ambition was pursued first through an intergovernmental treaty 
only open to EU Member States (the Dublin Convention which I will return to 
below) and a power for Member State officials to discuss refugee issues and 
drawn up resolutions (contained in the Maastricht Treaty in 1993). Subsequent-
ly asylum was made a fully EU competence for law making in 1999 through 
the Amsterdam Treaty.24 This was accompanied by Protocol 24 on asylum for 
nationals of Member States of the European Union (now attached to the Treaty 
on the European Union). This protocol is commonly called the Aznar Protocol 
after the Spanish President who championed it and lobbied hard for its adop-
tion.  
The protocol has nine pre-ambular paragraphs and one sole article. The 
article states that given the level of protection of fundamental rights in the EU, 
all Member States shall be regarded as safe countries of origin in respect of 
each other for all legal and practice purposes in relation to asylum matters.25 
The articles goes on to state that this means that an application for asylum 
                                         
24  H. Battjes, European Asylum Law and International Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
2008; G. Noll, Negotiating Asylum: The EU Acquis, Extraterritorial Protection and the 
Common Market of Deflection, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff 2000.  
25  E. Guittet, ‘“Ne pas leur faire confiance serait leur offense”. Antiterrorisme, solidarité, 
démocratique et identité politique’, Cultures et Conflits, (61)2 2006, p. 51-76. 
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made by a national of a Member State may be taken into consideration or 
declared admissible in another Member State only where: 
• The Member State of origin has derogated from the provisions of the 
ECHR; 
• The Council of Ministers of the EU has begun formal proceedings against 
the Member State of origin for failure to comply with human rights obliga-
tions (provided for in Article 7 TEU) (or where a decision against the Mem-
ber State has been adopted under those provisions); 
• Where a Member State unilaterally considers an application for asylum 
from a national of a Member State, this must be on the basis of a presump-
tion that the application is manifestly unfounded. 
 
The preamble justifies the protocol on the following grounds: 
• The TEU recognizes rights, freedoms and principles as set out in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights and as guaranteed by the ECHR; 
• The Court of Justice of the EU has the power to ensure fundamental rights 
are respected within the scope of EU law;  
• The TEU provides that membership of the EU is only open to states which 
comply with European fundamental rights and a mechanism for sanction ex-
ists against states which fail to live up to their commitments; 
• EU citizens are entitled to a special status and have the right to move and 
reside freely across the territory of the Member States in an area without 
internal frontiers; and finally 
• The institution of asylum should not be used for purposes alien to those for 
which it was intended. 
 
The protocol was controversial when it was adopted as part of the treaty. Bel-
gium made a declaration confirming that it would continue to consider all asy-
lum applications made to it (see below). 
The protocol effectively seeks to introduce a personal scope limitation 
which acts as a geographic limitation to the obligations of the Member States 
under the Refugee Convention. While Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention 
provides that ‘No Contracting Party shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee 
in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, member-
ship of a particular social ground or political opinion’, the Aznar Protocol per-
mits a Member State to limit its obligations to a refugee where his/her state of 
origin is a Member State of the EU. This purports to modify the underlying ob-
ligation of the state to ensure non-refoulement except in accordance with the 
Convention, but it does so without an amendment of the Convention (or indeed 
any recourse to the Executive Committee established by the Convention or the 
Nijmegen Migration Law Working Papers Series: 2012/03 
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United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) whose office is re-
sponsible for oversight of the implementation of the Convention).  
Once again Europe declared itself at the centre of the Refugee Convention 
but this time in an exact mirror image of what it did in 1951. Instead of Europe 
as the sole source of refugees and in search of international burden sharing, 
now Europe designates itself as a space which produces no refugees at all. 
The Aznar Protocol was, inter alia, the product of a prolonged discussion 
particularly in Spain about the right of its nationals to seek asylum in another 
Member State. In the 1980s, this occurred a number of times in respect of Brit-
ish nationals who sought asylum (and protection from extradition) in other 
Member States on the basis of the fear of persecution in Northern Ireland spe-
cifically in relation to the political violence which was taking place there.26 It is 
worth recalling that in 1995 the UK authorities were condemned by the ECtHR 
for the extrajudicial killing of three presumed IRA terrorists in Gibraltar.27 In 
the 1990s the spotlight turned to Spanish nationals from the Basque country 
who sought asylum in other Member States. In 1995 a number of members of 
the Spanish interior ministry, including a minister, were convicted by Spanish cri-
minal courts of operating an extrajudicial killing policy in respect of suspected 
members of the ETA (the Basque separatist organization engaged in political 
violence) and served jail sentences.28 In light of political violence (or terrorism) 
sponsored by parts of the Spanish state, a number of Spanish nationals were 
recognized as refugees in a number of EU Member States. A particularly an-
noying matter, for the Spanish government, was dragging on in Belgium at the 
end of the 1990s in which the Belgian government refused to interfere in the 
judicial consideration of the asylum claims of a number of Spanish nationals 
considered by the Spanish authorities to be ‘terrorists’.29 
The response of the Spanish government was to seek the Aznar Protocol 
which would exclude EU nationals, including Spanish nationals, from being rec-
ognized as refugees in other Member States. Solidarity among the govern-
ments of the Member States was intended to replace readiness to provide pro-
tection to EU citizens potentially at risk of persecution. While a number of non-
governmental organizations and UNHCR counseled against the adoption of the 
Protocol, it became part of the EU treaties in 1999. The attempted exclusion of 
EU nationals from protection in the Member States is directly related to some 
Member States’ concerns about political violence and the possibility that their 
                                         
26  D. Bigo, E. Guittet & A. Smith, ‘La participation des militaires à la sécurité intérieure : RU, 
Irlande du Nord’, Cultures et Conflits, (54)1 2005, p. 11-34. 
27  McCann and others v. the United Kingdom - 18984/91 [1995] ECHR 31 (27 September 
1995). 
28  Guittet 2006. 
29  For a full discussion of the matter see Guittet 2006, supra. 
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nationals had and might again receive protection in another Member State. 
However, the need of EU nationals for international protection has not disap-
peared because of the Anzar Protocol. According to UNHCR’s statistics,30 23% 
of Hungarians who sought asylum in Canada received protection in 2010. Simi-
larly, 20% of Slovakian nationals seeking it received protection in Canada 
while 62% of asylum-seeking Romanian nationals were granted asylum there. 
Clearly the Canadian asylum authorities did not agree with the Aznar Protocol 
that EU nationals, by definition, do not require refugee protection even at the 
beginning of the 21st century. 
The principle set out in the Aznar Protocol of the exclusion of nationals of 
the Member States from international protection in another Member State has 
been reflected in the other instruments forming part of the secondary legisla-
tion of the EU on asylum, the personal scope of which is limited to third country 
nationals – that is persons who are not nationals of the Member States.31  
The Troubling Geography of Refugee Protection in the EU 
The Aznar Protocol was not without precedent in changing the geography of 
refugee protection in Europe. Already in 1990 the EU Member States adopted 
two conventions, the Convention determining the State responsible for examin-
ing applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the Euro-
pean Communities (The Dublin Convention)32 and the Schengen Implementing 
                                         
30  Available at http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html (visited 14 May 2012). 
31  See for instance Art. 2 Qualification Directive (2011/95) ‘(c) “refugee” means a third 
country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of 
race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, is 
outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless person, who, being 
outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same reasons as mentioned 
above, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it, and to whom Article 12 
does not apply; (d) “refugee status” means the recognition by a Member State of a third 
country national or a stateless person as a refugee; (e) “person eligible for subsidiary 
protection” means a third country national or a stateless person who does not qualify as 
a refugee but in respect of whom substantial grounds have been shown for believing that 
the person concerned, if returned to his or her country of origin, or in the case of a state-
less person, to his or her country of former habitual residence, would face a real risk of 
suffering serious harm as defined in Article 15, and to whom Article 17(1) and (2) do not 
apply, and is unable, or, owing to such risk, unwilling to avail himself or herself of the 
protection of that country; (f) “subsidiary protection status” means the recognition by a 
Member State of a third country national or a stateless person as a person eligible for 
subsidiary protection; (g) “application for international protection” means a request 
made by a third country national or a stateless person for protection from a Member 
State, who can be understood to seek refugee status or subsidiary protection status, and 
who does not explicitly request another kind of protection, outside the scope of this Di-
rective, that can be applied for separately.’ 
32  OJ C 254/1 19 Aug.1997, 1-23. 
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Convention,33 both of which included the principle that third country nationals 
who seek international protection in a Member State are excluded from seek-
ing protection again in a second Member State (except in exceptional circum-
stances). The substance of these measures regarding responsibility for asylum 
seekers is part of the Dublin II Regulation.34 For the purposes of this analysis, 
however, the important element is the move towards exclusion of classes of 
persons from the scope of protection in a manner which modifies the objective 
of the Refugee Convention. Geographically, the EU treats itself as a single 
space for the consideration of asylum applications. Whether the application is 
made in Riga or Athens, the consequence is that state sovereignty no longer 
applies as it normally does. Instead, the fact of the application having been 
made in one place excludes the applicant from applying again anywhere else 
in the EU. Further, if the first application is rejected, that rejection has validity 
everywhere in the EU. If the person travels across the invisible borders of Eu-
rope and seeks asylum again in a second state, the application will usually 
simply be inadmissible or possible subject to a manifestly ill founded presump-
tion.35 Europe’s geography of state sovereignty melts before the claim to pro-
tection.  
Nonetheless, state sovereignty and geography matter for the asylum seek-
er. As UNHCR’s 2010 statistics show, an Afghan who applies for asylum in 
Greece has at best an 8% chance of receiving protection. However, the Af-
ghan who applies for asylum in Finland has a 56% chance of receiving protec-
tion. A Somali who seeks protection in Sweden has a 35% chance of receiving 
it while in Austria the percentage success is 87%.36 
This move has been the subject of academic criticism but this has primarily 
been directed at the outcome for the individual refugee rather than what may 
be considered the undermining of international rule of law.37 Moreno Lax at-
tacks the principle in international law and finds it wanting. Similarly, what ju-
                                         
33  OJ L 239/19, 22 Sept.2000, 19-35. 
34  Council Regulation No. 343/2003 OJ L 50/1, 18 Feb.2003, 1-14. 
35  M. Garlick, ‘Asylum Legislation in the European Community and the 1951 Convention: 
Key Concerns regarding Asylum Instruments Adopted in the “First Phase” of Harmoniza-
tion’, in T. Balzacq & S. Carrera, Security versus Liberty? A Challenge for Europe’s Future, 
Aldershot: Ashgate 2006, p. 45-60. Also see J. Vedsted-Hansen, ‘Common EU Standards 
of Asylum – Optional Harmonisation and Exclusive Procedures?’, in E. Guild & P. Minder-
houd, The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
2011, p. 255-272. 
36  Available at http://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.html (visited 14 May 2012). 
37  A. Hurwitz, The Collective Responsibility of States to Protect Refugees, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 2009; I. Boccardi, Europe & Refugees Towards An EU Asylum Policy, The 
Hague: Kluwer Law International 2002. 
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risprudence there has been on the issue has also focused on the first aspect.38 In 
2000, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) found that the onward shift-
ing of a Member State’s responsibility for protection from the risk of torture to 
another Member State had the effect, not of lifting responsibility from the first 
Member State, but rather aggregating it with that of the second. However, the 
Court did not condemn the Dublin Convention per se.39 Only ten years later did 
the ECtHR come back to this principle in a pair of judgments which place limits 
on the legality of this territorial move (see below, final section). Also in 2000, 
the UK’s House of Lords (as it then was) examined the compatibility of interpre-
tations of the Refugee Convention and Protocol in different Member States 
when considering the removal of an asylum seeker from the UK to those states, 
but did not challenge the principle.40 In the meantime, the EU took further the 
principle of territorial exclusion through the negotiation and ratification of re-
admission agreements with third states which include the return of third country 
national asylum seekers (i.e. nationals of states other than parties to the agree-
ment).41 This means that in principle where an asylum seeker makes a claim for 
protection in an EU Member State and the Member State can establish within 
the relevant time limits that the person transited or stayed on the territory of 
the state party to a readmission agreement, it can return the individual to that 
state party without a substantive consideration of the asylum claim. Currently 
the EU has readmission agreements agreed, in order of their signature with the 
following countries or territories (in order of signature): Hong Kong, Macao, Sri 
Lanka, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia, 
Moldova, Pakistan and Georgia (though the EU is seeking to renegotiate the 
agreements with Russia, Moldova and Ukraine). Negotiations are underway 
with (in order of opening of negotiations) Morocco, Algeria, Turkey, China, 
Cape Verde, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan.  
Geographically speaking what this has meant is that the space of refugee 
protection has been modified. The refugee who arrives in an EU country having 
passed through one of these other states or territories can be summarily re-
turned to that state or territory to pursue his or her claim to protection. It is as if 
                                         
38  V. Moreno Lax, ‘Must EU Borders Have Doors for Refugees? On the Compatibility of 
Schengen Visas and Carrier Sanctions with EU Member States’ Obligations to Provide In-
ternational Protection to Refugees’, (2008) 10(3) European Journal of Migration and Law, 
p. 315-364. 
39  ECtHR, T.I. v. the United Kingdom (Admissibility) (2000), Application No. 43844/98. 
40  Secretary of State For The Home Department, Ex Parte Adan R v. Secretary of State For 
The Home Department Ex Parte Aitseguer [2000] UKHL 67.  
41  N. Coleman, European Readmission Policy: Third Country Interests and Refugee Rights, The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 2009.  
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the EU states disappear from the protection map and all that is left is the third 
state in bold letters. 
The European Court of Human Rights Rethinks the Geography of 
Protection 
The map of refugee protection is not exclusively the result of state sovereign 
measures, negotiations and decisions. It has also become judicialized in a su-
pranational fashion. While national courts remain, by and large, bound to in-
terpret national law as provided to them by their legislation as adopted by 
their legislative bodies, supranational courts are bound to interpret the interna-
tional instrument(s) for which they are responsible. The result is often different 
from the outcome in a state which is able to control the judicial consideration of 
sovereignty by changing a procedural rule or excluding a section of a rule 
from judicial oversight.42 Changing the rules of judicial oversight at the supra 
national level is much more complex and requires all the states parties to the 
instrument to agree, often a very difficult endeavour indeed.43 The result is 
much less fluidity at the supranational level for the courts, and less capacity for 
any one state to influence the interpretative process as effectively as it can 
within its own national borders. This does not mean that supranational courts 
are necessarily liberal or conservative in any political sense. It does mean that 
they are less susceptible to arguments and claims based on national sovereign-
ty. They are not animals created by a single state sovereign arrangement 
alone and answerable within a system of state sovereignty exclusively. Thus the 
obviousness of state sovereign claims about geography may seem less obvious. 
As I discussed earlier, the EU’s Common European Asylum System depends 
on the acceptance by states and courts alike that the EU territory is single and 
unique for the refusal of any asylum application (though fragmented into state 
territories for the recognition of any asylum claim). While the claim is deter-
mined only by one state according to a set of rules determined by the EU, all 
other Member States are entitled to rely on the refusal as binding and thus 
divest themselves of any responsibility to provide protection to the individual. 
                                         
42  W. van Bennekom & J.H. van der Winden, Asielrecht, Amsterdam: Boom 2011. 
43  In 2011/12 the UK Government, holding the revolving presidency of the Council of 
Europe embarked on such an effort to convince the other 46 Member States to amend 
the ECHR to limit the powers of the ECtHR to consider evidence and to reduce the number 
of cases brought to the ECtHR. The final declaration of the meeting of heads of govern-
ment at the end of the UK presidency in Brighton, UK on 19-20 April 2012 indicates that 
little agreement could be reached. Only one substantive amendment was agreed for the 
ECHR – to insert into the preamble a reference to the principles of a margin of appre-
ciation (a notion developed by the ECtHR itself) and subsidiarity. See http://www. 
coe.int/en/20120419-brighton-declaration/. 
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Where an asylum seeker whose claim to international protection has been allo-
cated to one Member State, according to rules which, too, are based on a geo-
graphical principle, if that person turns up in another Member State, that sec-
ond state is entitled by EU law to send him or her back to the first state with no 
substantive consideration of the protection claims. This is the organizing princi-
ple of the Dublin II system described above.  
On 21 January 2011, however, the ECtHR handed down a judgment in 
MSS v. Belgium and Greece.44 The facts of the case are particularly sad. An 
Afghan national escaped overland to the EU to seek asylum. He was stopped 
in Greece where he was fingerprinted. He then continued on to Belgium where 
he applied for asylum. Under the EU rules, Greece was the country responsible 
for determining his asylum claim and he was sent back there. In Greece he was 
detained in dreadful conditions which had already been condemned by the 
ECtHR in 2010 as incompatible with Article 3 ECHR.45 He was then dumped out 
of detention without any reception facilities and ended up living rough in a 
park in Athens with no food, sanitary facilities or other amenities. He continued 
to try to escape Greece without success. On one occasion he was stopped by 
the Greek authorities as he sought to get to Italy and he was transferred to the 
Greek Turkish border for the purposes of an irregular expulsion. This was only 
prevented by the arrival of the Turkish border guards who challenged their 
Greek counterparts attempt to push the group of Afghan men across the bor-
der with no procedure whatsoever.  
Among the many questions which the case raised is whether Belgium, by 
sending M.S.S. back to Greece in happy reliance on EU law, was in breach of 
the ECHR. The decision of the ECtHR was that Belgium had in fact breached its 
duty to protect M.S.S. from torture, inhuman and degrading treatment prohibit-
ed by Article 3 ECHR. It reasoned  
 
‘358. In the light of the foregoing, the Court considers that at the time of the 
applicant’s expulsion the Belgian authorities knew or ought to have known 
that he had no guarantee that his asylum application would be seriously ex-
amined by the Greek authorities. They also had the means of refusing to 
transfer him. 
 
360. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the ap-
plicant’s transfer by Belgium to Greece gave rise to a violation of Article 3 of 
the Convention.’  
                                         
44  M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece - 30696/09 [2011] ECHR 108 (21 January 2011). 
45  Tabesh v. Greece - 8256/07 (French Text) [2009] ECHR 2224 (26 November 2009); 
S.D. v. Greece - 53541/07 French Text [2009] ECHR 2050 (11 June 2009). 
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By this decision, the ECtHR began to question the legitimacy of the EC’s claim 
that it is entitled to determine in what EU space an asylum seeker may make a 
claim for international protection. This is particularly so as the EU’s claim goes 
so far as to maintain that the actual conditions in which an asylum seeker may 
find him- or herself in the Member State to which he or she may be allocated is 
irrelevant to the EU Member State’s decision to send him or her there.46 This is 
so even where those conditions have been found lacking in European human 
rights law.  It is the claim contained, inter alia, in the Aznar Protocol that all EU 
Member States fully respect human rights which takes the direct challenge. The 
ECtHR stated what all EU asylum authorities knew (as indeed the ECtHR pointed 
out in its judgment) the reception conditions for asylum seekers in Greece of-
fend against even the most basic obligation to ensure that people are not sub-
ject to inhuman and degrading treatment. In the case, human rights protection 
trumped EU geography; Belgium was found to have violated its protection duty 
to M.S.S. by sending him to Greece under the Dublin II regulation. For an inter-
esting analysis of this decision see Moreno-Lax.47  
Just over a year later, the ECtHR determined the case of Hirsi & Os v. Ita-
ly48 regarding the actions of the Italian authorities in pushing away from Italian 
waters a little boat full of people seeking to get to Italy from Libya, some of 
them in order to seek asylum. In Hirsi, the applicant and his colleagues had 
been embarked onto a little boat with the assistance if not coercion of the Lib-
yan authorities, according to the judgment. The Italian authorities intercepted 
the little boat in international waters, took the people onto the Italian boat and 
then went to Libya and made them all disembark there into the hands of the 
Libyan authorities. At no time did the Italian authorities permit the people to 
make asylum or any other kind of claims to them. Further, all the people’s per-
sonal effects, according to the ECtHR ‘including documents confirming their 
identity were confiscated by the [Italian] military personnel’ (para 11, second 
paragraph). There is no indication that these personal effects were ever re-
turned to their owners. One of the arguments of the Italian authorities was that 
as the events took place in international waters and the waters of Libya, they 
took place outside Italian state sovereignty and thus the state magic which the 
crossing of an international border creates never happened. Whatever hap-
pened on the high seas could not be confounded with an act relating to the 
crossing of an international border, an essential element to becoming a refu-
gee. The ECtHR disagreed, indeed it was singularly unimpressed by this argu-
                                         
46  See Vedsted Hansen 2011, supra footnote 35. 
47  V. Moreno Lax, ‘Dismantling the Dublin System: M.S.S. v Belgium and Greece’, (2012) 
14(1) European Journal of Migration and Law, p. 1-31. 
48  Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy - 27765/09, 23 February 2012. 
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ment. As the people had been in the control of Italian authorities, those authori-
ties were responsible for the protection of their human rights in accordance with 
the ECHR. This includes an assessment of the risk of return to torture or punish-
ment contrary to Article 3. Further, the ECtHR found that the Italian authorities 
had carried out a collective expulsion in violation of Article 4 Protocol 4 ECHR 
and deprived these people of an effective remedy in breach also of Article 
13. The ECtHR warned: 
 
‘179. The above considerations do not call into question the right of States to 
establish their own immigration policies. It must be pointed out, however, that 
problems with managing migratory flows cannot justify having recourse to 
practices which are not compatible with the State’s obligations under the Con-
vention. The Court reiterates in that connection that the provisions of treaties 
must be interpreted in good faith in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty and in accordance with the principle of effectiveness (see Mamatkulov 
and Askarov, cited above, § 123). 
180. Having regard to the foregoing, the Court considers that the removal of 
aliens carried out in the context of interceptions on the high seas by the au-
thorities of a State in the exercise of their sovereign authority, the effect of 
which is to prevent migrants from reaching the borders of the State or even to 
push them back to another State, constitutes an exercise of jurisdiction within 
the meaning of Article 1 of the Convention which engages the responsibility 
of the State in question under Article 4 of Protocol No. 4.’ 
 
For an interesting analysis of the case see Nascimbene.49 The European geog-
raphy of state sovereign border controls changes substantially as a result of 
these two paragraphs. The activities of states regarding preventing people 
from getting to their borders become part of the border control activities which 
must comply with European human rights norms. When people are in the control 
of state authorities, irrespective of the physical place where this may happen, if 
those authorities belong to states bound by the ECHR, then the treatment of 
those people as regards immigration management must comply with the ECHR 
rules. Not only does the non-refoulement obligation apply, but further, states 
are obliged to provide a procedure to consider each case individually and an 
effective remedy against refusal to allow those people to arrive at the sover-
eign borders of the state in order to enter. Any action to the contrary, even 
when applied to people who do not need international protection may consti-
                                         
49  B. Nascimbene, The ‘Push-bask Policy’ Struck Down Without Appeal? The European Court 
of Human Rights in Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy, Istituto Affari Internationali Documenti 
IAI 12, 02E – March 2012. 
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tute unlawful collective expulsion prohibited by the ECHR. This means that the 
prohibition on collective expulsion does not simply apply to expulsion from sov-
ereign territory but it also includes expulsion from state jurisdiction. This indeed 
changes not only the geography of European refugee protection but also im-
migration controls in general. 
One of the most sobering aspects of the Hirsi judgment is outside the for-
mal argument of the decision itself. In an annex on page 38 of the judgment, 
after the reasoning and findings, the ECtHR includes a list of the applicants – 
who were these people and where they are now. I have copied the schedule 
and attach it here at Annex 1. It is the people who have died who are the most 
troubling. What happened to these people to bring about their deaths after 
the Italian authorities handed them over to their Libyan counterparts? One can 
only hope that this question disturbs the sleep of some officials in Europe. 
In both M.S.S. and Hirsi a central question is what geography applies to 
asylum in Europe. Can states modify unilaterally or by collective sovereign de-
cision the space available to the individual seeking protection? In M.S.S. it 
seems that there are limits to this territorial move. Where a state seeks to duck 
its refugee responsibilities by passing the individual on to another state, it may 
still remain liable for what happens to the individual. Even where the other 
state is an EU state with all the human rights characteristics so grandly pro-
claimed in the preamble to the Aznar Protocol, there is no umbrella to protect 
the sending state from a breach of its human rights obligations where it knew 
or ought to have known that the treatment the individual would get in the re-
ceiving state would not pass the torture, inhuman and degrading treatment test.  
This line of reasoning regarding the geography of protection also informs 
the ECtHR judgment in Hirsi. In the face of attempts by states to avoid their hu-
man rights obligations to people potentially arriving at their borders by sea, 
the ECtHR effectively found that EU officials carrying out border related activi-
ties carry with them the jurisdiction of the ECHR irrespective of their actual rela-
tionship with the border of state sovereignty. People can be expelled unlawful-
ly from a state even before they have arrived at its formally recognized bor-
der as a result of the activities of border guards seeking to prevent them so 
arriving. People seeking international protection (at least under Article 3 ECHR) 
it seems, are entitled to seek this from officials even in international waters and 
those officials are obliged to provide them with an opportunity to seek asylum. 
The geography of protection is clearly on the move. The attempt, by some 
European states, to establish a monopoly over the space of protection is result-
ing in a change in international jurisprudence on where and how human rights 
obligations apply and who is entitled to their protection has come up against 
regional human rights obligations. The reach of human rights law appears to be 
adjusting to follow state actors, at least from Council of Europe countries, wher-
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ever they go in the world. The beneficiaries are increasingly global, no longer 
trapped in a human rights geography which is instrumentalized to render them 
without rights or remedies. Article 1 ECHR seems to be filling the lacunae which 
other parts of the human rights acquis have left open – everyone now really 
does seem to mean what it says. Further, jurisdiction is no longer tied to state 
borders when the activities which state actors are carrying out are designed to 
efface those borders as regards access to protection.  
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Annex 1 
LIST OF APPLICANTS 
 
  Name of applicant Place and date of 
birth 
Applicant’s current 
situation 
1. JAMAA Hirsi Sadik Somalia, 
30 May 1984  
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
507-09C00279) 
2. SHEIKH ALI Mohamed Somalia, 
22 January 1979 
Refugee status granted 
on 13 August 2009 (N. 
229-09C0002) 
3. HASSAN Moh’b Ali Somalia, 
10 September 1982 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-09C00008) 
4. SHEIKH Omar Ahmed Somalia, 
1 January 1993 
Refugee status granted 
on 13 August 2009 (N. 
229-09C00010) 
5. ALI Elyas Awes Somalia, 
6 June 1983 
Refugee status granted 
on 13 August 2009 (N. 
229-09C00001) 
6. KADIYE Mohammed Abdi Somalia, 
28 March 1988 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-09C00011) 
7. HASAN Qadar Abfillzhi Somalia, 
8 July 1978 
Refugee status granted 
on 26 July 2009 (N. 
229-09C00003) 
8. SIYAD Abduqadir Ismail Somalia, 
20 July 1976 
Refugee status granted 
on 13 August 2009 (N. 
229-09C00006) 
9. ALI Abdigani Abdillahi Somalia, 
1 January 1986 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-09C00007) 
10. MOHAMED Mohamed Abukar Somalia, 
27 February 1984 
Died on unknown date  
11. ABBIRAHMAN Hasan Shariff Somalia, date unknown Died in November 
2009 
12. TESRAY Samsom Mlash Eritrea, date unknown Whereabouts unknown 
13. HABTEMCHAEL Waldu Eritrea, 
1 January 1971 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-08C00311); resi-
dent in Switzerland 
14. ZEWEIDI Biniam Eritrea, 
24 April 1973 
Resident in Libya 
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15. GEBRAY Aman Tsyehansi Eritrea, 
25 June 1978 
Resident in Libya 
16. NASRB Mifta Eritrea, 
3 July 1989 
Resident in Libya 
17. SALIH Said Eritrea, 
1 January 1977 
Resident in Libya 
18. ADMASU Estifanos Eritrea, date unknown Whereabouts unknown 
19. TSEGAY Habtom Eritrea, date unknown Held at Chucha Deten-
tion Camp, Tunisia 
20. BERHANE Ermias Eritrea, 
1 August 1984 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 May 2011; 
resident in Italy 
21. YOHANNES Roberl Abzighi Eritrea, 
24 February 1985 
Refugee status granted 
on 8 October 2009 (N. 
507-09C001346); 
resident in Benin 
22. KERI Telahun Meherte Eritrea, date unknown Whereabouts unknown 
23. KIDANE Hayelom Mogos Eritrea, 
24 February 1974 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-09C00015); resi-
dent in Switzerland 
24. KIDAN Kiflom Tesfazion Eritrea, 
29 June 1978 
Refugee status granted 
on 25 June 2009 (N. 
229-09C00012); resi-
dent in Malta 
 
 
